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Abstract 
 
 
This paper analyzes the patient characteristics that affect the choice between public and private 
health care providers in Istanbul, Turkey. In addition to socioeconomic variables, such as insurance 
status or income, which have often been considered in the previous literature, we also focus on 
another factor, the availability of social networks, which might determine ease of access to hospital 
services in developing countries. The analysis is based on data from a household survey conducted 
in Istanbul. The econometric results indicate that potential social ties play an important role in 
choosing public health care centers over private ones for minor health problems. As public facilities 
have long been characterized by long waiting lines even for appointments for medical exams, this 
finding indicates that households who possess higher levels of social networks might be using those 
in easing access to public facilities. 
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1 Introduction 
 
During the last two decades the share of private hospitals in healthcare delivery has expanded 
rapidly in Turkey, as can be observed by the facts that the number of private hospitals doubled 
during the period 2000-2005 and that as of 2006 the percentage of patients treated in private 
facilities has reached a sizeable amount of 11. It is a truism that private hospitals are more 
expensive than public hospitals and that healthcare services are freely provided to some types of 
patients in public hospitals. On the other hand, public hospitals carry considerably higher non-
monetary costs, such as long waiting times, and the quality of care is often lower due to the heavy 
workload and budgetary constraints faced by these hospitals.  
 
This paper aims to analyze the patient characteristics that affect the choice between public and 
private providers in Istanbul, Turkey. In addition to socioeconomic variables, such as insurance 
status or income, which have often been considered in the previous literature, we focus on 
another factor: availability of social networks, which might determine the ease of access to 
hospital services in the context of developing countries.  
 
It is hypothesized that by using their social networks, individuals can unfairly gain advantage over 
the others by shortening the waiting time for a surgery, or an appointment, by reducing the costs, 
by getting special care, etc. Expressing in economic terms, the monetary and non-monetary costs 
of access to either type of hospitals may be considerably lower when the patient has connections 
in a given hospital, to the extent that the system is open to manipulation via patronage networks. 
Therefore, under the assumption that clientelism is systemic factor, it is expected that availability 
of networks would affect a patient’s choice between hospitals. Although from a theoretical 
perspective favoritism is a manifestation of the principle-agent problem and thus independently 
exists from the ownership status (viz. private versus public), empirical studies by and large 
conclude that it is rather associated with organizations that are under public ownership. 
 
The analysis is based on a face-to-face survey of 600 people (of which 370 are reported to have 
health problems in the past two years) conducted in Istanbul in May 2006. The survey provides 
information about various household characteristics including employment, health insurance 
status, education, a proxy for income, and a proxy for material security. Furthermore, the survey 
provides us with a variety of measures on ethnicity, religion, immigration status, and social 
awareness. These measures are used to construct variables that proxy for the potentiality for 
social networks. The survey does not indicate the specific hospital chosen by the patient but only 
whether the hospital was public or private. 
  
In the analysis we run standard binary logit models where the dependent variable is a dummy 
which shows whether the hospital chosen by the patient is public or private. Considering the 
possibility that individual behavior regarding the choice between public and private health care 
facilities may depend on the type of visit, the econometric analysis is first done for all hospital 
visits, and then repeated for visits relating to relatively minor health problems, such as medical 
exams, diagnostics, and outpatient treatment. 
 
The econometric analysis provides some evidence for the hypothesis that the existence of social 
ties plays an important role in choosing public health care centers over private ones for the cases 
where minor health problems are experienced. As public facilities have long been characterized 
by long waiting lines even for appointments for medical exams, this finding indicates that 
households who possess higher levels of social networks might be using those in easing access to 
public facilities. Furthermore, the results are found to be in parallel with the literature in 
suggesting that the socioeconomic status (or material well-being) as well as social security 
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characteristics do play a role in the choice of patients. The inclusion of serious treatments, on the 
other hand, makes us loose the statistical significance of social ties in the choice of the type of 
health care centers.  
 
This investigation is of importance to the extent that, if the existence of particularistic networks 
does play a role in the healthcare system in Turkey, it will bring about inefficiencies (the 
associated opportunity cost of time allocated to networking by both patients and members of 
health cares) as well as unfairness (given that networks are not evenly distributed in a given 
society). As Turkey is in the process of reforming its healthcare system, the picture that the 
analysis will provide will be of help in diagnosing the problematic areas. 
 
Section 2 provides an overview of the health system in Turkey. Sections 3 and 4 summarize the 
literature on patient’s hospital choice and social networks, respectively. The data set and the 
results of the econometric analysis are presented in Section 5, while a conclusion is given in 
Section 6.  
 
 
2 The health system in Turkey 
 
In Turkey health care is financed by government budget, various social security mechanisms, and 
private payments (directly or through private voluntary health insurance schemes). The total 
health expenditure currently fluctuates at around 7-8 % of the GDP, and public expenditures 
make about 70% of the total health expenditures.1 There exist three social security institutions. 
Retired civil servants are covered by Government Employees Retirement Fund (GERF). Health 
care services for active civil servants are paid by their organizations through the government 
budget but they are subject to similar rules as GERF members. Private sector employees and blue 
collar public employees are covered by Social Insurance Organisation (SIO), and self employed 
are covered by Bağ-Kur (BK). There also exists a plan for those who are poor and are unable to 
pay for health care (Green Card). Additionally, there are less than one million (over seventy plus 
million) people with a private health insurance. 2 
 
Most of the hospitals in Turkey are operated by the Ministry of Health (about two thirds of the 
total bed capacity). Private hospitals constitute only about 7% of the total hospital beds as of 
2006, but, as mentioned above, they have been growing rapidly in the last two decades. Private 
hospitals are concentrated in big cities and especially in Istanbul where they make about 20% of 
total hospital bed capacity with 6217 beds in 124 hospitals as of 2006. There also are hospitals 
operated by the Ministry of Defense (8% of total bed capacity), universities (15% of total bed 
capacity) and other institutions such as municipalities and foundations (2% of total bed capacity). 
Ministry of Defense hospitals are primarily serving military personnel and there were restrictions 
on access to university hospitals by SIO members at the time of the survey (Yataklı Tedavi 
Kurumları İstatistik Yıllığı 2006). 
  
Until recent years, SIO operated its own hospitals and SIO coverage was restricted to those 
hospitals. Similarly, GERF and BK coverage was restricted to those hospitals operated by the 
Ministry of Health. While private hospitals existed, patients covered under social security had to 
pay full charge of health care services out of their pocket. In recent years, efforts to collect the 
                                                 
1 http://www.tuik.gov.tr 
2 The number of people covered by these institutions is not very clear. According to SIO statistics active and retired 
civil servants make about 15% of population, while SIO and BK cover 50% and 23% of the population respectively. 
Those with a Green Card are reported to be about 11 million (17% of the population). The inconsistency in the 
numbers can be explained by the large number of BK members who do not pay their premium (Savas et al. 2002). 
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three social security institutions under one roof have intensified. In 2003 SIO patients were 
allowed to make use of hospitals other than those operated by SIO. GERF and BK patients were 
also allowed to use SIO hospitals. In 2005 SIO stopped operating its own hospitals and 
transferred ownership of those to the Ministry of Health.  
 
Starting in 2004 social security organizations made contracts with private hospitals and allowed 
their members to use services of those private hospitals. In May 2006, when the survey was 
conducted, patients had access to a wide collection of private hospitals. As the payment by the 
social security organizations to private hospitals covered only part of the expenses of private 
hospitals for most medical procedures, private hospitals generally charged extra fees.  
 
Public hospitals are free of charge under all three types of social security, but the quality of the 
care at public hospitals is often criticized as being low. As primary care services are not 
satisfactory and the referral system is not functioning well, patients often go directly to outpatient 
clinics of the hospitals. This leads to long waiting hours to see a doctor in public hospitals (see, 
e.g., World Bank, 2001). High demand from patients also means that doctors may have a 
tendency to spend little time with patients. Anecdotal observations and the results of diagnostic 
surveys indicate that it is common to make out-of-pocket payments or to give presents to the 
doctors and/or hospital personnel or use connections for better care and service in public 
hospitals in order to get a favourable treatment (Adaman, 2003).  
 
 
3 Patients’ hospital choice 
 
Patients’ hospital choice can be modeled as a utility maximization problem where utility is a 
function of health status and consumption. Hospital characteristics, such as the quality of care, 
could have a direct impact on health status. Monetary and non-monetary costs of access could 
have an indirect impact on consumption through the budget constraint.  
 
Empirical literature has found that various hospital characteristics are significant determinants of 
hospital choice. Distance to the facility (e.g. Tai et al., 2004, for rural patients), various proxies for 
quality of service (Luft et al., 1990, for various surgical procedures), and costs of treatment have 
been among those. The impact of the hospital characteristics were found to depend on patient 
characteristics such as the severity of illness or income level. Phibs et al. (1993), more specifically, 
compared deliveries by high risk and low risk women and the quality of hospitals (as proxied 
being a university one or not) was found to be more important for high risk patients compared to 
low risk ones.  
 
In this study we focus on one particular hospital characteristic, the ownership type of the 
hospital. Whether the hospital is private or public could have important implications for the costs 
and quality of the hospitals and hence on the utility of the patient. As already mentioned, private 
hospitals do generally carry higher monetary costs but lower non-monetary costs such as shorter 
waiting times.  
 
As to the quality, public and private hospitals face differential incentives and accordingly are 
expected to behave differentially. Because private hospitals are generally not subsidized by 
government, they rely on payments by patients. Hence they are expected to take measures that 
satisfy customers. They would provide better service whenever this is observable by patient and 
increase the profits of the hospital. Andaleeb (2000) offers evidence from patient surveys that 
private hospitals are considered to provide better quality, based on perceptions of the patients in 
Bangladesh. On the other hand, considering information asymmetries, private hospitals would be 
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expected to provide inferior service compared to public hospitals when (1) the quality of service 
is not observable by patients and (2) inferior quality cuts costs of the hospital or increases its 
revenues. Ordering unnecessary care could be an example for this. Angelopoulou (1998) found 
for Greece that public hospital patients are more interested in medical resources and technology 
than contextual and environmental features of a hospital compared to the patients of private 
hospitals. 
 
The advantages and disadvantages of private versus public facilities may differ across countries as 
well. In developed countries non-monetary costs of access to public facilities are generally lower 
compared to those of developing countries. The quality of service at public facilities is also 
generally higher than those in developing countries. Empirical evidence shows that in such 
countries insurance availability determines the choice of hospital. Rodriguez and Stoyanova 
(2004), for example, showed that in Spain private hospital choice could be explained by insurance 
status. In developing countries, conversely, service quality is generally lower and waiting times are 
long in public facilities. Accordingly, it is sometimes observed that patients bypass free public 
facilities to get care from private facilities that may be further away and/or more expensive (Akin 
and Hutchinson, 1999).  
 
The literature on hospital choice in Turkey is scarce. The only comprehensive one, that by Akıncı 
et al. (2004), analyzes patients from three public and one private hospitals. Patients are asked 
questions to determine the importance of various factors in the hospital choice. Based on the 
answers, descriptive statistical analysis reveals that accessibility of the hospital plays the most 
important role followed by the availability of modern equipment and facilities. The study also 
indicates that, though not statistically significant, there exist differences in the influence of factors 
for public versus private hospitals. Therefore, this motivates the need for a formal econometric 
analysis of public versus private hospital choice. Our study uses discrete choice framework and 
also stresses the importance of social networks as an additional factor influencing this choice. 
 
 
4 Social networks 
 
An element which may affect hospital choice is social capital and, in particular, social networks 
available to the patient. Although being a vaguely defined concept, social capital can be described 
as relations among people that facilitate certain outcomes such that, in the absence of social 
capital, these outcomes would be unlikely.3 Hence, social capital is productive and closely linked 
with personal interactions in society. Social networks, in this setting, are webs of informal ties 
among individuals that characterize an individual’s social capital. To broadly categorize, it is 
possible to state that the use of social networks can be grouped in four: information exchange, 
social learning, cooperation and trust, and risk sharing.4   
 
As social capital—and social networks—are closely linked to relationships among individuals in a 
social environment, their ties to individual decision-making, and in turn, social outcomes and 
economic development, have been investigated by a vast literature. Economic growth, adoption 
of new technologies, educational attainment, health outcomes, and risk sharing are only a few 
examples of areas in which the effects of social networks have been studied.  
 
                                                 
3 See Arrow (2000), Dasgupta (2000), and Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005) for the definition of social capital being 
incoherent and unclear. See the seminal work of Coleman (1988) for an introduction of social capital. 
4 The examples include Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2006) for information exchange; Bandeira and Rasul (2006), 
and Conley and Udry (2001) for social learning; Fafchamps and Minten (2002) for cooperation and trust; Fafchamps 
and Kurosaki (2002), and Fafchamps and Lund (2003) for risk sharing. 
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In the context of health outcomes, the literature on social networks generally concentrates on the 
relationship between the quantity of social ties and being healthy. For example, Pearce and Smith 
(2003) state that because of the inherent inequalities among individuals in terms of income and 
socioeconomic status, the concept of social capital is becoming increasingly important for health 
outcomes. Specifically, increased income inequality in a society reduces the available social capital, 
thereby causing poorer health outcomes. The mechanism through which this idea works is as 
follows. As inequality rises, individuals’ perception of their place in the social hierarchy gets 
affected in an undesirable way. As a result, people start to participate in community organizations 
at a lower rate and alienate themselves, leading to poorer health. In the same vein, House (2002) 
argues that policy should aim at enhancing the socioeconomic status of the disadvantaged groups 
in society so that the health status of these groups as well as of the overall society will improve. 
Cattell (2001) analyzes the effect of social networks on the health outcomes of poor people and 
suggests that different neighborhoods lead to different social ties, and social ties have 
implications on health outcomes.  
 
Andersen (1995) stresses the importance of access to health care and the role of what he calls 
“enabling resources” in accessing health care. In this context, social networks, obviously, act as 
enabling resources to facilitate access to health care through information dissemination. For 
example, some individuals who are not aware of the existence of a certain treatment or a certain 
health care center may acquire knowledge in this regard via their social contacts. Hendryx et al. 
(2002), using household data from the U.S., test whether higher levels of social capital lead to a 
better access to health care. Their findings indicate that individuals living in metropolitan areas 
with high levels of social capital do not have significant problems in health care access.  
 
Taking into account the fact that the most rapidly urbanizing cities are in the developing world, 
Vlahov and Galea (2002) suggest that the most important factors that influence health outcomes 
of urban populations in developing countries are social and physical environment as well as 
access to health care. Therefore, social networks, in defining the socioeconomic status of an 
individual as well as in facilitating access to health care, are significant determinants of health 
outcomes in this respect.  
 
As social networks are considered as a tool of risk sharing, they equally play an important role in 
financing health expenditures in communities where formal insurance markets are not well-
developed. Community financing schemes, which are more formal than risk sharing through 
informal family/friend ties, have become increasingly important in the developing world. These 
are, in fact, closely linked with social networks in a sense that the establishment of such 
community financing schemes is based on the formal and informal ties within a society. Preker et 
al. (2002) provide evidence from the developing world and suggest that such schemes may even 
be inclusive of the poor who are in general socially excluded. Habtom and Ruys (2007), using 
data from Eritrea, report evidence for the importance informal insurance schemes in providing 
modern health services where free public health services and private insurance are unavailable. 
Thus, there is room for policy in terms of enhancing the sustainability of these financing 
arrangements in the context of health expenditures.  
 
The aforementioned studies all have a common theme: social capital and social networks are 
good for health outcomes and for health financing. Rose (2000) takes on a different aspect of this 
issue, one that is common to what he calls “antimodern” societies. Specifically, in antimodern 
societies, characterized by organizational failure, social networks can invade the malfunctioning 
of formal organizations to correct for the deficiencies in an undesirable way. In essence, this 
correction is done through instigating mechanisms to commence the allocation of goods and 
services again, albeit through bribery and favoritism. Although this is a means of making sure the 
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formal organizations start functioning again, it is certainly not an equitable mechanism. The same 
line of argumentation surfaces in different studies, when, for example, Warren (2006) refers to 
the “dark side” of social capital, or when Foley et al. (2001) proposes a distinction between 
“social” versus “unsocial” capital. In this context, Adaman and Çarkoğlu (2003) argue for the 
presence of the dark side of social capital and corruption in Turkey, specifically during the 2001 
economic crisis.  
 
In terms of access to health care, this might imply, for example, that through favoritism and/or 
bribery, individuals can unfairly gain advantage over others by shortening the waiting time for 
surgery or an appointment, reducing the costs, etc. The monetary and non-monetary costs of 
access to either type of hospital might be considerably lower when the patient has connections in 
a given hospital. More specifically, connections might decrease the price paid for care in private 
facilities, or they could cut down the waiting costs and increase the quality of care in public 
facilities. Depending on the magnitude of these, one’s choice of hospital could be different 
compared to the case without network connections. In the context of Turkey, it is reported that 
social networks could provide easier access to, and more efficient care from, public health care 
services (Adaman and Yoltar, 2005).  
 
The impact of networks on hospital choice could have further consequences for the efficiency 
and equity in access to healthcare services. Networking carries its costs. One has to spend time to 
get into networks and arrange better access to the facilities. If networking is done through care 
providers such as physicians or nurses, they would have less time available to perform their 
healthcare related duties. The network-related access to healthcare services would also create 
inequity in access to healthcare services since those with no such connection would have to wait 
even longer hours than they would if nobody used networks. 
 
 
5 Data set and results of econometric analysis 
 
5.1 Data set 
 
The data used in this paper is from a face-to-face survey conducted in May 2006 in Istanbul—a 
city of 12 million and the cultural, intellectual and financial center of Turkey. Because of this, the 
city attracts a huge amount of migration from rural as well as other urban areas in Turkey. This, 
no doubt, creates a highly heterogeneous population in terms of economic, educational, and 
cultural aspects. It is therefore possible to argue that this heterogeneity is one of the reasons for 
the presence and continuation of tightly connected social networks in addition to other cultural, 
sociological, and political motives in Turkey in general. The most common ties are claimed to be 
family and friends networks. Other important ones are of a colocality nature (for those relatively 
recently migrated) as well as of a religious and political kind; to these one should add NGOs and 
professional societies which provide a facilitating environment for people to form their own 
networks. These facts about Istanbul make the city a natural candidate to study social networks 
and their effects on a variety of decision-making problems.  
 
The sampling procedure used is the random stratified one; the target survey size was 600, which 
represents the city at household level within a 95% confidence band with a margin of ±0.04. Of 
the 600 households interviewed, 370 reported that they had faced a health problem that required 
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them to visit a health care center in the past two years.5 These households were then asked 
whether they preferred public facilities or private facilities, as well as the reasons of their visits. 
 
Table 1 displays information on the distribution of visits to health care centers by the type of 
visits. While some households had only one type of visit to the health care center during the past 
two years, others had more than one type of visit. The bulk of visits seem to be of the type 
“medical exam, diagnostic, outpatient”, indicating that these are, in general, low-cost items. In 
addition, regular drug treatments are also largely observed. These indicate that the majority of the 
households in the sample visited health care centers for mostly low-cost items. In making their 
choices between public and private health care centers, whether for low-cost or high-cost items, 
patients are assumed to have considered the trade off between wait times and price, given the 
existence or non-existence of social networks.  
 
Table 1 – Distribution of health center visits by type of visits  
 
 Visit only 
once 
Multiple 
visits 
Birth, surgery 30 62 
Regular drug treatment 45 110 
Inpatient 8 17 
Rehab, chemotherapy, physiotherapy, dialysis and other continuous treatments 17 22 
Medical exam, diagnostic, outpatient 133 126 
 
Note: The first column shows the number of visits for each type for the households who had only one type of visit in 
the past two years. The second column shows, in addition to the first column, the number of visits for the 
households who had multiple visits during the period of analysis. 
 
Table 2 provides summary statistics of the data. As is shown in the table, 77% of the households 
that experienced health problems in the sample chose public health care centers over private 
health care centers. The survey also provides us with various household characteristics including 
employment, health insurance status, education, a proxy for income, a proxy for material security, 
and proxies for social networks. These characteristics are used to investigate whether or not they 
in fact play a role in determining the choice of health care facility by the household. We describe 
the calculation of these variables below.  
 
Based on the survey results, we are able to categorize the respondents into two depending on 
whether they are working or not. In the analysis that follows, we use two variables, 
“working/household size” and “retired/household size”, to proxy for the employment status of 
respondents. In these variable definitions, a member of the household is characterized as working 
if he/she is of age 18+ and has a regular full-time or part-time job. Household size used in these 
ratios is in fact the number of household members aged 18+. The rationale behind these 
calculations is that these variables show the percentage of households of working age who receive 
regular wage and pension payments. Based on these calculations, for an average household, the 
ratio of working members to total adult members is 39%, while the ratio of retired members to 
total adult members is 11%. Since working and retired individuals have some forms of social 
security that can be used at public facilities which also provide coverage to immediate family 
members, the a priori expectation is that these two variables should be positively related to the 
probability that public facilities are chosen. 
 
                                                 
5 With this reduction in the sample size, the city is represented at household level within a 95% confidence band with 
a margin of ±0.05. 
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Health insurance status is measured by five different types of insurance the household possesses, 
GERF, SIO, BK, Green Card, and private insurance. Note that these different schemes are 
described in Section 2 above. As this is a household level variable and as different members of a 
household may have different—and even possibly more than one type of—insurance, we allow 
for multiple insurance types for a household. Thus, to proxy for health insurance status, we form 
five dummy variables, one for each type. Our prior expectation is that households with GERF 
and SIO are more inclined toward public facilities as such facilities provide almost free health 
care for those people.  
 
Table 2 – Summary statistics: sample means and standard deviations (in parentheses) 
 
 All sample Only for medical exam, 
diagnostic, outpatient 
Public hospital 0.77 0.74 
 (0.42) (0.44) 
Working/HH size 0.39 0.44 
 (0.30) (0.33) 
Retired/HH size 0.11 0.09 
 (0.19) (0.17) 
Socio-economic status -0.04 0.37 
 (1.35) (1.43) 
Material security -0.04 0.32 
 (1.45) (1.53) 
GERF 0.11 0.16 
 (0.32) (0.37) 
SIO 0.66 0.67 
 (0.47) (0.47) 
BK 0.12 0.10 
 (0.32) (0.30) 
Private health insurance 0.03 0.06 
 (0.16) (0.23) 
Established 0.01 -0.12 
 (1.29) (1.36) 
Marginal -0.01 0.06 
 (1.09) (1.08) 
 
 
 
A proxy for material security using survey data on certain possessions of the household is 
constructed, such as cars, internet connection, etc., and receivables and payables, if any. By 
utilizing the data on material possessions and the net debt stock of the household, an index of 
material security using principal components analysis (PCA) is created. Table 3 provides 
information on the results of this analysis and the components of material security. The a priori 
expectation is that people with higher material security levels tend to choose private health care 
facilities.  
 
In the survey, the respondents were asked how much the average monthly expenditures of a 
similar household would be. We use this information as a proxy for household income; however, 
we adjust this for those households who were not asked to pay any rent for housing (as they used 
their acquaintances’ residence), and for those who received regular amounts of in kind and in 
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cash transfers. Per capita income of a household is then calculated by using the weighted 
household size.6 
 
Table 3 – PCA results for the Material Security Index 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, we also form a proxy for measuring the education level of a household. The number 
of years spent in compulsory education is subtracted from the total years of education for each 
household member; this gives the education score for each member. Then the average education 
score for the household is calculated by dividing the total score by the weighted household size. 
This gives us what we call “education per capita” for the household. 
 
 
Table 4 – PCA results for the socioeconomic status variable 
 
 Socioeconomic status 
(Component 1) 
Material security 0.60 
Income per capita 0.52 
Education per capita 0.60 
% Total variation explained 62 
 
 
We also form a variable that we call “socioeconomic status.” Socioeconomic status measures 
three dimensions: material security, income per capita (in natural logarithm), and education per 
capita.7 Table 4 presents the results of the PCA analysis on material security, income per capita 
and education per capita performed to construct the socioeconomic status variable. The a priori 
expectation is that people with higher levels of socioeconomic status tend to choose private 
health care facilities.  
 
The survey provides us with a variety of measures on ethnicity, religion, immigration status, and 
social awareness. These measures are used to construct variables that proxy for the potentiality 
for social networks. Specifically, it is natural to expect that people of the same ethnic origin may 
                                                 
6 Weighted household size is computed according to Eurostat methodology as follows: any household member older 
than 14 is counted as an adult. The first adult member gets a weight 1, the other adult members receive a weight 0.5, 
and each child receives a weight of 0.3. For example, a household composed of a husband and a wife with two 
children aged less than 14 has a weighted household size of 1+0.5+0.3+0.3=2.1. 
7 In our econometric analyses, we include either the socioeconomic status variable or the three dimensions that form 
it separately. In fact, when we do the latter, we find that income per capita and education per capita have poor 
statistical performances. 
 Material security 
(component 1) 
Internet connection at home 0.45 
Central heating 0.41 
Car 0.40 
Dishwasher 0.47 
LCD/plasma TV 0.28 
Vacation outside the country 0.29 
Receivables 0.20 
Payables 0.07 
House/apartment 0.20 
% Total variation explained 25 
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help one another at different times; similar ideas can be raised about people of the same religious 
sect. In addition, if an individual came to Istanbul as an immigrant, he/she may still have ties with 
those people that used to live in his/her town of origin and had moved to Istanbul. Those 
relationships may also prove to be useful at times of need. The role of social participation in 
proxying for the potentiality of social networks is clearer. One would expect that an individual 
who is more active socially would possibly have a higher number of social ties.  
 
In the survey data, it is possible to identify the sect of Islam that the household belongs to: 
Allevite, Sunnite or neither. It is also possible to measure the degree of religiousness. Using this 
information, two measures of religion are constructed via PCA that explain a total of 93% of the 
variation in the data. The first measure puts more weight on being Sunnite and religious, the 
second puts more weight on being Allevite and religious. Hence, it is possible to interpret these 
measures as “strongly Sunnite” and “strongly Allevite.” If an individual is, say, strongly Allevite, 
then it is possible to expect that he/she can use his/her ties with other strongly Allevite people 
when necessary. Therefore, these two measures are thought of as a potential source of social 
networks. These two measures will then be used to construct proxies for potential social 
networks available for households.  
 
The survey also allows us to differentiate people with respect to their ethnic origin. Specifically, 
the respondents were asked whether they can speak Kurdish. A dummy variable indicating being 
Kurdish is then constructed. As explained above, it is expected that people of the same ethnic 
origin may ask for help from one another at times of difficulty, and hence, ethnic origin indicates 
a potentiality of social networks.  
 
The immigration status of households is also thought of as an important indicator of the available 
social networks for two reasons. First, locals may have more social ties than immigrants. Second, 
immigrants may have colocality ties. In some instances, being new in town may have different 
implications from being in town for some time. Hence, it is possible to think of grouping 
households into three categories: locals, old immigrants, and new immigrants. In this paper, the 
distinction between new immigrants and old immigrants is made as follows: households who 
came to town before the average time of all immigrants are counted as old immigrants and vice 
versa. In addition, it may prove to be important to count for internally displaced people (IDP) 
due to the dispute in the South Eastern Anatolia. These people are, in general, poor and socially 
excluded (see Adaman and Ardıç, forthcoming). Hence, it is expected that their network ties are 
not very strong. Therefore, immigration status is proxied with three variables: old immigrants and 
new immigrants (relative to locals), and IDPs.  
 
As mentioned above, another ingredient of the potentiality of social networks is social 
participation and awareness. Social participation and awareness are measured in a variety of 
dimensions by the survey. First, the respondents were asked whether they participated in social 
work, whether they are a member of a social organization, and whether they helped (in kind or in 
cash) to those in need. Second, the respondents were asked whether they went to concerts, 
theatres or movies, whether they paid visits to neighbors/friends, whether they attended 
continuing education, religious meetings and visits. These dimensions are then reduced to an 
index of what we would like to call “social awareness” using PCA. This index explains 32% of 
the total variation in the dimensions mentioned above. Any increase in any one of these 
dimensions, that is, increases in social participation, cultural activities, etc., do in turn increase the 
index of social awareness. It is plausible to expect that individuals who have higher levels of this 
index are more socially aware, and they possess a higher number of potential social ties.  
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The four dimensions, i.e. religion (2 variables), ethnicity, immigration status (3 variables) and 
social awareness, are then combined together via PCA to form measures of the potentiality of 
social networks.8 The results of this PCA are summarized in Table 5. The first two components 
extracted explain 40% of the total variation in these dimensions. We name these components as 
“established” and “marginal”, respectively. Our interpretation of these two components is as 
follows. Households that have higher levels of “established” networks are those, relative to the 
households with “marginal” networks, who are more socially aware, seem to receive more from 
their religious ties, whose ethnic identities are not pronounced, and who are not new in town. 
Hence, they have well-established social ties. In contrast, households that have higher levels of 
marginal networks, relative to established networks, seem to be more on the edge of the society, 
being IDPs, less socially aware, and having a more pronounced ethnic identity.  
 
 
Table 5 – PCA results for the potentiality of social networks 
 
 Established 
(Component 1) 
Marginal 
(Component 2) 
Strongly Sunnite -0.01 -0.68 
Strongly Allevite 0.37 -0.05 
Ethnicity -0.09 0.49 
Social awareness 0.30 0.10 
New immigrant -0.61 -0.01 
Old immigrant 0.58 0.22 
IDP -0.23 0.48 
% Total variation explained 23 17 
 
 
 
5.2 Econometric analysis  
 
This section presents the results of the econometric analysis where the determinants of the 
choice between public versus private health care facilities are analyzed. The probability of 
choosing a public facility (or a private facility) is assumed to depend on a number of individual 
characteristics such as the type of health insurance (if any), socioeconomic status, potentiality of 
social networks, etc. The standard binary logit estimation framework is applied. In what follows, 
we present the results of the marginal effects that are calculated at the sample averages of each 
independent variable.9 In practice, marginal effects calculated in this manner show the effect of 
an infinitesimal change in each independent variable, from the initial values given by those of an 
average person, on the probability of each outcome. Marginal effects are tabulated in Table 6 
below. 
 
Considering the possibility that individual behavior regarding the choice between public and 
private health care facilities may depend on the type of visit, the econometric analysis is first done 
for all hospital visits, and then repeated for visits due to relatively minor health problems defined 
as medical exams, diagnostics, and outpatient treatment. This is mainly due to the issue that for 
many people cost considerations might become a big issue once there is a major health problem, 
                                                 
8 Note that it is possible to use all these measures separately as identifiers of potential social networks. However, in 
our econometric analyses, we uncovered that, those measures, when used one-by-one, do not have a significant 
impact on the outcome while, when combined, they play a significant role. This might indicate that although some of 
the variation in these variables is not relevant for our purposes, once the appropriate portion is extracted, it becomes 
possible to observe the effects of the potentiality of networks. See more on the results of the econometric analysis in 
Section 5.2. 
9 Estimated logit coefficients are in the Appendix, Table A-1. 
 12
and therefore, they might choose to go wherever is cheaper. Since we do not have data on either 
the costs of the services used or their alternatives, by using the data for minor health problems 
only, we hope to isolate the effects of prices. Hence, Table 6 presents two sets of regressions.  
 
For the larger sample, i.e. for all hospital visits, the first regression includes nine independent 
variables: established networks, marginal networks, the ratio of working adults to total adults, the 
ratio of retired adults to total adults, socioeconomic status, and four dummy variables for types 
of insurance held by the household. Socioeconomic status is statistically significant and negative, 
indicating that those individuals whose socioeconomic status level is one unit above that of the 
average person in the sample will have the probability of choosing public facilities over private 
facilities reduced by 0.08. In addition, the dummy variables representing the different types of 
insurance are also statistically significant. Relative to individuals with Green Cards, those 
individuals with GERF and SIO prefer public facilities with a higher probability, and others with 
BK and private health insurance schemes prefer private facilities with a higher probability.  
 
The second regression takes out socioeconomic status and inserts material security. It is found 
that material security is statistically significant, and a one unit increase in material security relative 
to the average person in the sample reduces the likelihood of choosing public facilities by 0.05. 
Moreover, those households who have GERF and SIO relative to those with Green Cards still 
prefer public facilities over private, and those who have private health insurance relative to those 
with Green Cards still prefer private facilities over public ones. However, we are no longer able 
to differentiate between the behavior of households with BK and households with Green Cards. 
Therefore, it is possible to speculate that only after controlling for items besides material security 
that are included in socioeconomic status, i.e. income and education, it is possible to differentiate 
between the behavior of these types of households.  
 
These two regressions are repeated for a smaller sample that includes those households who 
visited health care centers only for minor health problems. As mentioned above, this could 
isolate any potential effect due to differences in prices. 
 
In the first regression, involvement in established networks matters for the choice between public 
and private facilities. Those people who have a level of established networks that is one unit 
higher than the average person in the sample have a rise in their probability of choosing public 
over private facilities by 0.07. It is possible to interpret this finding as showing that those people 
with higher than average potentiality of social networks tend to go to public health care centers 
for minor health problems, most likely due to the benefits of these networks in easing the access 
to such facilities. The effects of socioeconomic status and the dummies for types of health 
insurance schemes in this smaller sample are the same as those found in the first regression for 
the whole sample, except for the BK dummy, which becomes insignificant for the smaller 
sample. Hence, it is possible to deduce that, once minor health problems are considered, the 
behavior of households with BK and the behavior of households with Green Cards cannot be 
differentiated. The regression results when material security is inserted in the place of 
socioeconomic status are similar. 
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Table 6 – Logit results-marginal effects 
 
 All hospital visits Only for medical exam, diagnostic, outpatient 
 [1] [2] [1] [2] 
Established 0.03  0.03  0.07 ** 0.07 ** 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
Marginal 0.03  0.03  0.01  0.01  
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
Working/HH size 0.04  -0.05  -0.17  -0.23  
 (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.18)  (0.15)  
Retired/HH size 0.02  0.01  -0.27  -0.23  
 (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.31)  (0.31)  
Socio-economic status -0.07 ***   -0.06    
 (0.02)    (0.04)    
Material security   -0.05 ***   -0.07 ** 
   (0.02)    (0.03)  
GERF 0.14 *** 0.12 ** 0.22 *** 0.22 *** 
 (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06)  
SIO 0.15 ** 0.15 ** 0.34 *** 0.40 *** 
 (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.13)  (0.13)  
BK -0.13  -0.12  -0.19  -0.12  
 (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.18)  (0.17)  
Private health insurance -0.49 ** -0.48 ** -0.58 *** -0.49 * 
 (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.22)  (0.27)  
N 343  343  121  121  
LR 41  35  35  37  
Pseudo R_square 0.11  0.10  0.25  0.26  
 
Dependent variable: probability of choosing public facilities. Two sets of regressions:  
One for all hospital visits, another for medical exam, diagnostic and outpatient. For both, two models are estimated as in this table.  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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It is possible to interpret the findings of the econometric analysis as follows. When all types of 
visits are considered, households in the sample tend to choose private facilities if they have a 
higher socioeconomic status or material security and if they have private health insurance. They 
tend to choose public facilities if they have GERF or SIO insurance schemes. However, as we 
lack price data, it is possible that when major health problems are involved, regardless of the long 
wait lines in public facilities, individuals may still prefer public health care centers over private 
ones as public facilities have lower prices. Hence, using a smaller sample of households who only 
went to health care centers due to minor problems, the analysis is repeated. The findings in terms 
of socioeconomic status or material security, GERF, SIO, and private health insurance schemes 
do not change when major health problems are left out. However, the presence of a higher level 
of established networks gain importance in choosing public over private facilities. This finding 
can be interpreted as social networks playing a role in easing access to public health care centers.  
 
 
6 Conclusion and discussion 
 
The aim of this paper is to study the importance of social networks for the choice of public 
versus private health care centers. For this purpose, the paper utilizes survey data from Istanbul, 
and constructs measures of the potentiality of social networks. Based on econometric analysis, it 
is possible to conclude that potential social ties play an important role in choosing public health 
care centers over private ones in the case of minor health problems. As public facilities have long 
been characterized by long waiting lines even for appointments for medical exams, this finding 
indicates that households who possess higher levels of social networks might be availing 
themselves of those to ease access to public facilities.  
 
Helpful as they are, social networks used in this manner, in general, create unequal treatment 
among the members of the society, as has been argued by Rose (2000). Hence, there is room for 
policy in terms of correcting for the organizational failures in public facilities so that a more 
equitable as well as more efficient public health provision can be achieved.  
 
For more important health problems, the findings indicate that social networks are not influential 
in hospital choice. A potential reason for this could be that obtaining favors related to the care of 
major health problems require a large networking cost, and therefore people refrain from using 
their connections. But it could also be due to the likelihood that such health treatments are better 
organized so that networks are not operational. It is not possible to distinguish between these 
two without a full understanding of the workings of networks.  
 
Hence, it is important to note that this paper is only a first attempt toward characterizing the 
effects of social networks on household behavior in terms of hospital choice in Istanbul. Since 
the findings of the analysis indicate the presence of network effects, this calls for a more 
thorough examination of the issue using large-scale survey data and a variety of other potential 
measures of social networks. As there is room for policy to correct for the inefficiencies in the 
Turkish health system, we feel that this line of research is extremely important to provide a 
general understanding of some of the problems in this respect.  
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Appendix: 
 
 
 All hospital visits Only for medical exam, diagnostic, outpatient 
 [1] [2] [1] [2] 
Established 0.16  0.16  0.44 ** 0.52 ** 
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.21)  (0.22)  
Marginal 0.20  0.20  0.07  0.07  
 (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.24)  (0.24)  
Working 0.08  0.31  -2.10 * -2.45 * 
 (0.43)  (0.44)  (1.26)  (1.25)  
Retired 0.04  0.08  -1.87  -2.18  
 (0.58)  (0.58)  (1.53)  (1.57)  
Socio-economic status -0.29 ***   -0.35    
 (0.10)    (0.22)    
Material security   -0.44 ***   -0.44 ** 
   (0.12)    (0.21)  
GERF 0.91 * 1.17 ** 2.16 ** 2.36 ** 
 (0.51)  (0.53)  (0.95)  (0.98)  
SIO 0.82 ** 0.84 ** 2.02 *** 2.47 *** 
 (0.33)  (0.34)  (0.68)  (0.76)  
BK -0.67 * -0.73 * -0.65  (0.25)  
 (0.40)  (0.40)  (0.84)  (0.88)  
Private health insurance -2.15 ** -2.19 ** -2.83 ** -2.33 * 
 (0.88)  (0.92)  (1.29)  (1.28)  
Constant 0.75 ** 0.57  1.94 * 1.92 * 
 (0.37)  (0.39)  (1.12)  (1.12)  
N 343  343  121  121  
LR 35  41  38  40  
Pseudo R_square 0.09  0.11  0.27  0.29  
 
Table A-1 – Logit Results. Dependent variable: probability of choosing public facilities. Two sets of regressions:  
One for all hospital visits, another for medical exam, diagnostic and outpatient.  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
